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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background information and problem statement 
The current Companies Act1 (the Act) which replaced the previous Companies Act 61 
of 1973, introduced an important innovation and classification into South African law: 
the concept of business rescue proceedings and the administrative machinery 
required to implement them.2 
Business rescue3 is aimed at facilitating the rehabilitation of a financially distressed4 
company. This is achieved by first placing its supervision temporarily in the hands of 
a business rescue practitioner;5 secondly, by imposing a temporary moratorium on 
the rights of claimants;6 and thirdly, by developing and implementing a business 
rescue plan.7 
Despite the introduction of the Act, the concept of ‘business rescue’ has given rise 
too many challenges in establishing its interpretation, meaning, effect and 
application. One of these challenges relates to a creditor’s right to enforce its claims 
against sureties of the company during business rescue proceedings.8 Section 133 of 
the Act places a moratorium9 on legal proceedings with the result that no legal 
proceedings can be instituted against the company while it is under business rescue. 
The questions arising from the above are: firstly, will creditors lose their claims 
against sureties of the company while the company is under business rescue; and 
secondly, what is the effect of an adopted business rescue plan on a creditor’s right 
to claim against sureties of the company? 
                                                             
1
 71 of 2008. 
2
 Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
3
 Section 128(1)(b). See also Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 443; Gribnitz & Appelbaum 
Business Rescue and Compromise 87; Delport The New Companies Act Manual 141; Mongalo et al 
Companies and other Business Structures 236. 
4
 Section 128(1)(f). 
5
 Section 128(1)(b)(i). 
6
 Section 128(1)(b)(ii). 
7
 Section 128(1)(b)(iii). See also to s 128(1)(c) read together with s 150. 
8
 Swart & Lombard (2015) 78/3 THRHR 521. 
9
 The moratorium applies from the commencement of business rescue proceedings and the adoption 
of the business rescue plan. 
 
9 
In this dissertation I consider the liability of sureties during business rescue 
proceedings and further evaluate the impact and effect a moratorium and business 
rescue plan have on the liability of sureties. The application of section 154 will also 
be considered. 
 
I concentrate on those business rescue provisions which deal with the liability of 
sureties of the companies in business rescue as in my view an overview of the entire 
business rescue procedure is unwarranted in this context. 
 
1.2 Chapter overview 
In Chapter 2 I focus on the business rescue provisions relating to the right of the 
creditor to hold a surety of a company in business rescue, liable. I further examine 
the effect of an adopted business rescue plan on a creditor’s claim against sureties of 
the company. The moratorium in section 133 of the Act is evaluated to determine 
whether sureties also benefit from its protection once a company has failed to meet 
its obligations. Emphasis is also placed on the legal position before and after the 
adoption of the business rescue plan. 
 
In Chapter 3 I evaluate the legal position of sureties as far as it is relevant to the 
issues discussed in the preceding chapter(s) regarding business rescue. Specific 
attention is paid to issues such as the accessory nature of sureties, and the surety’s 
right of recourse. 
 
Chapter 4, ‘Concluding Remarks and Recommendations’, presents my findings and 
concludes with suggestions and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BUSINESS RESCUE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE LIABILITY OF SURETIES WITH 
REFERENCE TO LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 of the Act has introduced a new corporate rescue regime termed ‘business 
rescue proceedings’ into South Africa law to provide an effective method by which a 
financially distressed company can be rescued while balancing the rights and interest 
of all relevant stakeholders.10 
The prerequisites for the initiation of business rescue proceedings are that the 
company must be financially distressed,11 and there must appear to be a reasonable 
prospect of rescuing it.12 A company is considered financially distressed if it appears 
that it is unlikely to be able to pay all of its debts as they fall due and payable within 
the next six months, or if it appears that the company is reasonably likely to become 
insolvent within the next six months.13 Business rescue has the unique consequence 
that it places a general moratorium on any legal proceedings or executions against 
the company, or in relation to any property owned by the company.14 This means that 
                                                             
10
 Chapter 6 of the Act being ss 128-155 read with s 7(k). 
11
 Section 129(1)(a). See also Loubser (part 1) 2010 TSAR 502. 
12
 Section 129(1)(b). See also Loubser (part 1) 2010 TSAR 502; Gribnitz & Appelbaum Business 
Rescue and Compromise 90; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 443 & 456; Mongalo et al 
Companies and other Business Structures 236; http://www.business-rescue.co.za/legislation/Section-
129-Company-resolution-to-begin-business-rescue-proceedings.php#.Vz1oTelf2M8. For case law 
dealing with the interpretation of reasonable prospect of rescuing the company refer to Southern 
Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC); 
Propspec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 and Another 2013 (1) SA 542 (FS); 
Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd 2013 (4) SA 539 
(SCA); Koen v Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC); 
Zoneska Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Bonatla Properties (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 
2012 (4) All SA 590 (WCC); Swart v Beagles Run Investments 25 Pty Ltd 2011 (5) SA 422 (GNP). 
13
 Section 128(1)(f)(i) and (ii). See also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 784; Loubser 
(2008) 20/3 SA Merc LJ 381; Loubser (part 1) 2010 TSAR 502; Rushworth 2010 Acta Juridica 377; 
Gribnitz & Appelbaum Business Rescue and Compromise 89; Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 443; Wassman 2014 De Rebus 36; Cassim et al Business Structures 460; Mongalo et 
al Companies and other Business Structures 237. 
14
 Section 133(1). See also Loubser (part 2) 2010 TSAR 689; Delport The New Companies Act 
Manual 149; Van Rooyen N “The impact of business rescue proceedings on sureties” available at  
http://www.barnardinc.co.za/index.php/articles/20-articles/108-the-impact-of-business- rescue-
proceedings-on-sureties (accessed 19 May 216). 
11 
no legal proceedings may be commenced or continued without either the written 
consent of the business rescue practitioner,15 or leave of a court.16 
In the course of business rescue proceedings neither a guarantee nor a surety given 
by a company in favour of any other person may be enforced against the company.17 
The only exception to this is if enforcement takes place with leave of a court and in 
conformity with any terms the court considers ‘just and equitable’ in the 
circumstances.18 
The problem identified for further examination in this chapter is what legal effect 
business rescue proceedings will have on a creditor’s right to enforce its claims 
against the company’s sureties. I also give a brief overview of Chapter 6 of the Act 
and explain the effect its provisions have on a creditor’s rights against sureties of the 
company. The chapter incorporates the common law, statutory law, and court 
judgments. Certain of the business rescue provisions are discussed merely to offer 
background to the effect they have on the liability of a company’s sureties while 
business rescue proceedings are underway. 
2.2  Commencement of business rescue proceedings 
The business rescue process can be initiated in one of the following two ways. 
Firstly, by means of a resolution passed by the board of the company voluntarily to 
initiate business rescue proceedings.19 Secondly, affected parties20 can apply to a 
                                                             
15
 Section 133(1)(a). See also Rushworth 2010 Acta Juridica 383; Delport The New Companies Act 
Manual 149; Cassim et al Business Structures 471. 
16
 Section 133(1)(b). Refer to s 128(e) of the Act for the meaning of ‘court’. See also Kopel Business 
Law 425; Delport The New Companies Act Manual 149; Bradstreet (2011) 128 SALJ 365; Gribnitz & 
Appelbaum Business Rescue and Compromise 34 & 88; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 
443 & 450; Cassim et al Business Structures 471. 
17
 Section 133(2). See also Van Rooyen N “The impact of business rescue proceedings on sureties” 
available at http://www.barnardinc.co.za/index.php/articles/20-articles/108-the-impact-of-business-
rescue-proceedings-on-sureties (accessed 19 May 2016). 
18
 Section 133(2). See also Gribnitz & Appelbaum Business Rescue and Compromise 145; Sharrock 
et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 281; Cassim et al Business Structures 472; Mongalo et al Companies 
and other Business Structures 248. 
19
 Section 129(1). See also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 785; Loubser (part 1) 2010 
TSAR 501; Rushworth 2010 Acta Juridica 377; Loubser (2008) 20/3 SA Merc LJ 380; Gribnitz & 
Appelbaum Business Rescue and Compromise 99; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 452; 
Delport The New Companies Act Manual 142; Kopel Business Law 425; Wassman 2014  De Rebus 
36; Stein & Everingham Companies Act Unlocked 412; Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 277; 
Cassim et al Business Structures 461; Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 237. 
20
 Section 128(1)(a)(i) to (iii) defines an affected person as a shareholder or creditor of the company; 
any registered trade union representing employees of the company; and if any of the employees of the 
12 
court for an order placing the company under supervision and to initiate business 
rescue proceedings.21 
2.2.1 Voluntary board resolution 
The first method of initiating business rescue proceedings is by way of a resolution 
which may be adopted only by the board of the company.22 The resolution to 
commence business rescue proceedings may be adopted if the board has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the company is financially distressed23 and there 
appears to be a reasonable prospect of rescuing it.24 The board resolution may not 
be adopted where liquidation proceedings have already been initiated by or against 
the company.25 
Once the board resolution has been adopted, the company must notify and consult 
with all affected parties as they have a right to participate in the proceedings.26 
Affected persons have three fundamental rights – the right to information; the right to 
participation in the proceedings; and the right to make an offer.27 If the company 
neglects to comply with the prescribed provision, or fails to notify the affected parties 
of the proceedings, the resolution lapses and is regarded as null and void.28 Unless 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
company are not represented by a registered trade union, each of those employees or their respective 
representatives. See also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 786; Loubser (part 1) (2010) 
TSAR 502; Bradstreet (2011) 128 SALJ 366; Bradstreet (2010) 22  SA Merc LJ 198; Gribnitz & 
Appelbaum Business Rescue and Compromise 34 & 85; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 
443; Cassim et al Business Structures 463; Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 
239. 
21
 Section 131(1). See also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 785; Loubser (2008) 20/3  SA 
Merc LJ 380; Loubser (part 1) 2010 TSAR 501; Gribnitz & Appelbaum Business Rescue and 
Compromise 123; Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 277; Cassim et al Business Structures 461. 
22
 Section 129(1). See also Loubser (2008) 20/3  SA Merc LJ 380; Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 452; 2014  De Rebus 36; Stein & Everingham Companies Act Unlocked 412; Cassim 
et al Business Structures 461-2; Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 238. 
23
 Section 129(1)(a). See also Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 240. 
24
 Section 129(1)(b). See also Loubser (2008) 20/3  SA Merc LJ 381; Rushworth 2010 Acta Juridica 
377; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 456; Cassim et al Business Structures 461; Mongalo 
et al Companies and other Business Structures 240. 
25
 Section 129(2)(a). See also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 785; Rushworth 2010 Acta 
Juridica 377; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 458; Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 
278; Cassim et al Business Structures 462; Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 
238. 
26
 Section 130(4). See also Stein & Everingham Companies Act Unlocked 416; Sharrock et al Hockly’s 
Insolvency Law 278; Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 242; Loubser (2008) 
20/3  SA Merc LJ  380-1. 
27
 Section 145(1)(a)-(d). See also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 800; Gribnitz & 
Appelbaum Business Rescue and Compromise 400. 
28
 Section 129(5)(a). See also Loubser (part 1) 2010 TSAR 503; Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 453 & 460; Stein & Everingham Companies Act Unlocked 412; Sharrock et al Hockly’s 
13 
approved by a court, no supplementary resolution will be allowed within a period of 
three months after the first resolution was adopted.29 The business rescue 
proceedings officially begin on the date when the board resolution is filed with the 
Companies Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC).30 If affected parties wish to 
have the board resolution set aside,31 they may, at any time during the 
commencement of the business rescue proceedings until the plan has been 
adopted,32 apply to court on any of the following grounds.33 Firstly, there is no 
reasonable basis for believing that the company is financially distressed.34 Secondly, 
there is no reasonable prospect of rescuing the company.35 Thirdly, the company has 
failed to comply with procedures prescribed in section 129.36 In considering the 
application, the court may set the board resolution aside on any of the grounds listed 
above, or if it is of the view that it is just and equitable to do so.37 The court may also 
afford the business rescue practitioner time to compile a report to determine whether 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Insolvency Law 277 & 280; Cassim et al Business Structures 463; Mongalo et al Companies and other 
Business Structures 239. 
29
 Section 129(5)(b). See also Loubser (2008) 20/3 SA Merc LJ 381; Stein & Everingham Companies 
Act Unlocked 412; Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 278; Cassim et al Business Structures 464; 
Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 239. 
30
 Section 132(1)(a)(i). In Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) para 12 the court held 
that date on which business rescue proceedings begin depends on what date is meant by the phrase: 
“[When]… an affected person applies to the court for an order…”. See also Cassim et al 
Contemporary Company Law 786; Rushworth 2010 Acta Juridica 382; Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 478(1); Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 280; Cassim et al Business Structures 
462 & 469; Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 238. 
31
 Section 130(5). 
32
 Section 130(1). Confirmed in African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (6) SA 471 GNP at para 56. See also Loubser (part 1) 2010 
TSAR 505; Bradstreet (2011) 128 SALJ 368; Gribnitz & Appelbaum Business Rescue and 
Compromise 110; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 462(3); Stein & Everingham 
Companies Act Unlocked 414; Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 278; Cassim et al Business 
Structures 465; Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 241. 
33
 Section 130(1)(a)(i) to (iii). See also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 787; Loubser (part 
1) 2010 TSAR 505; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 461; Cassim et al Business 
Structures 465; Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 241. 
34
 Section 130(1)(a)(i). See also Delport The New Companies Act Manual 142; Sharrock et al Hockly’s 
Insolvency Law 278; Cassim et al Business Structures 465; Mongalo et al Companies and other 
Business Structures 241. 
35
 Section 130(1)(a)(ii). See also Delport The New Companies Act Manual 142; Sharrock et al Hockly’s 
Insolvency Law 278; Cassim et al Business Structures 465; Mongalo et al Companies and other 
Business Structures 241. 
36
 Section 130(1)(a)(iii) See also Loubser (2008) 20/3 SA Merc LJ 382; Loubser (part 1) 2010 TSAR 
503; Bradstreet (2011) 128 SALJ 368; Gribnitz & Appelbaum Business Rescue and Compromise 103; 
Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 461; Delport The New Companies Act Manual 142; 
Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 278; Cassim et al Business Structures 465; Mongalo et al 
Companies and other Business Structures 241. 
37
 Section 130(5)(a)(i) and (ii). See also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 787; Sharrock et al 
Hockly’s Insolvency Law 278; Cassim et al Business Structures 465; Mongalo et al Companies and 
other Business Structures 242. 
14 
or not the company is financially distressed, or if there are reasonable prospects of 
rescuing the company.38 If, after considering the report, the court determines that 
neither of the above grounds is present, it may set aside the company’s resolution.39 
2.2.2 Court order 
The alternative method by which to initiate business rescue proceedings is for an 
affected person, at any time before the company has adopted a resolution to 
commence with business rescue proceedings, to apply to court for an order to this 
effect.40 Every affected party must be informed of the application41 and has the right 
to participate42 in the hearing of the application.43 Business rescue proceedings 
commence once the affected party ‘applies’ to court.44 The court will consider the 
application and may grant an order to commence with business rescue proceedings 
if it is satisfied either that: the company is financially distressed;45 or the company 
has failed to effect payment in terms of an obligation under a public regulation46 or 
                                                             
38
 Section 130(5)(b)(i) and (ii). See also Cassim et al Business Structures 465. 
39
 Section 130(5)(b)(ii). See also Stein & Everingham Companies Act Unlocked 415; Sharrock et al 
Hockly’s Insolvency Law 278; Cassim et al Business Structures 465; Mongalo et al Companies and 
other Business Structures 242. 
40
 Section 131(1). Refer to Sibakhulu Construction (Pty) Ltd v Wedgewood Village Golf Country Estate 
(Pty) Ltd 2013 (1) SA 191 (WCC) in Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 462(2) & 463. See 
also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 790; Loubser (2008) 20/3 SA Merc LJ 382; Rushworth 
2010 Acta Juridica 380; Bradstreet (2011) 128 SALJ 366; Delport The New Companies Act Manual 
143; Kopel Business Law 425; Wassman 2014 De Rebus 36; Stein & Everingham Companies Act 
Unlocked 416; Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 279; Cassim et al Business Structures 467; 
Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 243. 
41
 Section 131(2)(b) read with regulation 124. See also Stein & Everingham Companies Act Unlocked 
417; Cassim et al Business Structures 467. 
42
 Section 131(3). See also Gribnitz & Appelbaum Business Rescue and Compromise 114; Delport 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 462(1); Stein & Everingham Companies Act Unlocked 417; 
Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 279; Cassim et al Business Structures 467; Mongalo et al 
Companies and other Business Structures 244. 
43
 Section 131(3). See also Loubser (2008) 20/3 SA Merc LJ 382; Rushworth 2010 Acta Juridica 380; 
Bradstreet (2011) 128 SALJ 367; Bradstreet (2013) 130 SALJ 47; Gribnitz & Appelbaum Business 
Rescue and Compromise 124; Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 462(1); Stein & 
Everingham Companies Act Unlocked 417; Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 278; Cassim et al 
Business Structures 467; Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 244. 
44
 Section 132(1)(b). See also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 792; Loubser (part 1) 2010 
TSAR 512; Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 280; Cassim et al Business Structures 469; 
Mongalo et al Companies and other Business Structures 245. 
45
 Section 131(4)(a)(i). 
46
 Section 131(4)(a)(ii). ‘Public regulation’ is defined in s 1 of the Act to mean “any national, provincial 
or local government legislation or subordinate legislation, or any licence, tariff, directive or similar 
authorisation issued by a regulatory authority or pursuant to any statutory authority.” See also Cassim 
et al Contemporary Company Law 791; Cassim et al Business Structures 468. 
15 
contract in respect of employment-related matters;47 or lastly, if the court considers it 
just and equitable to do so for financial reasons.48 
2.3 Business rescue plan 
After the commencement of business rescue proceedings, a business rescue 
practitioner is appointed to develop a business rescue plan.49 The business rescue 
plan is developed after consultation with management of the company, its creditors, 
and other affected persons.50 The business rescue plan must contain at least the 
information prescribed in section 150(2), as well as other information necessary to 
assist affected persons to decide whether they should accept or reject the plan.51 The 
company must publish the plan no more than 25 business days after the appointment 
of the business rescue practitioner.52 Subsequently, the business rescue practitioner 
must arrange a meeting with the company’s creditors within ten business days after 
the publication of the plan.53 The purpose of this meeting is to present the proposed 
business rescue plan for consideration by the creditors and other holders of voting 
interests.54 
If the business rescue plan is supported by holders of more than 75 per cent of the 
creditors’ voting interest – which must include the support of at least 50 per cent of 
the independent creditors’55 voting interest – it will be approved on a preliminary 
                                                             
47
 Section 131(4)(a)(ii). See also Loubser (2008) 20/3  SA Merc LJ 382; Bradstreet (2011) 128 SALJ; 
Gribnitz & Appelbaum Business Rescue and Compromise 125; Delport Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 462(8); Kopel Business Law 425; Kleitman 2013 Without Prejudice 34; Sharrock et al 
Hockly’s Insolvency Law 279; Cassim et al Business Structures 468; Mongalo et al Companies and 
other Business Structures 245. 
48
 Section 131(4)(a)(iii). In Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein 
(Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (3) 273 (GSJ) CJ Claassen J held that wording “otherwise just 
and equitable to do so for financial reasons” meant that the court must consider the financial positions 
of all stakeholders in business rescue provision, with the exception of the business rescue practitioner. 
See also Bradstreet (2011) 128 SALJ 368; Bradstreet  (2013) 130 SALJ 48; Delport Henochsberg on 
the Companies Act 462(8) & 464; Kopel Business Law 425; Kleitman 2013 Without Prejudice 34; 
Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 279; Cassim et al Business Structures 468; Mongalo et al 
Companies and other Business Structures 245. 
49
 Section 150(1). 
50
 Section 150(1). See also Delport The New Companies Act Manual 148. 
51
 Section 150(2). See also Delport The New Companies Act Manual 148. 
52
 Section 150(5). See also Delport The New Companies Act Manual 148. 
53
 Section 151(1). See also Delport The New Companies Act Manual 148. 
54
 Section 152. See also Delport The New Companies Act Manual 148. 
55
 Refer to definition of independent creditor in s 128(1)(g). 
16 
basis.56 If the plan has been approved on a preliminary basis it will also constitute 
final approval on condition that it does not affect the rights of holders of any class of 
the company’s securities.57 If the business rescue plan indeed affects the rights of 
securities holders, the business rescue practitioner must arrange a meeting with 
those affected.58 Should the majority of voting rights at this meeting be in support of 
the business rescue plan, it will be regarded as having been finally adopted.59 If the 
majority oppose the plan it will be regarded as having been rejected.60 
2.3.1 Effect of business rescue plan 
Once a business rescue plan has been adopted it is binding on the company and 
every creditor and holder of the company’s securities regardless of whether they 
were at the meeting, voted in favour of the plan, or proved a claim.61 The effect that 
an adopted business rescue plan will have on sureties of a company is currently 
uncertain. 
Section 154 – which regulates the discharge of debts and claims against the 
company – provides that a business rescue plan may stipulate that a creditor who 
has agreed to the discharge of the whole or part of the debt owing to him or her will 
lose the right to enforce the debt or part of it.62 The consequences referred to in 
section 154(2) are conditional upon the adoption and implementation of the business 
rescue plan.63 Furthermore, once the business rescue plan has been approved and 
implemented, the creditor will be unable to enforce any debt owed by the company 
immediately before the commencement of the business rescue process, save to the 
extent provided for in the plan.64 
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In order to determine the position of the creditor who has not agreed to the business 
rescue plan, the cases of DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO65 and 
Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio v Greeff66  are instructive. In DH Brothers 
the court stated that a business rescue plan may only specify that a creditor who has 
acceded to the discharge of the whole or part of the debt, may be deprived of its 
rights to enforce its claims.67 The court added that because section 152(4) of the Act 
makes an adopted business rescue plan binding on all creditors, including non-
accepting creditors, any provision in the plan which would allow for more than the 
voluntary discharge of the whole or part of the debt would be regarded as 
incompetent.68 In Tuning Fork the court criticised the legislature’s use of the word 
‘acceded’. It stated that the use of this word is inappropriate as the legislature could 
not have intended that the discharge, as contemplated in section 154(1), would 
depend on the creditor agreeing to it or not.69  
Consequently, from the wording of section 154(2) “not entitled to enforce any debt 
owed by the company…unless provided for in the business rescue plan”, it can be 
assumed that, unless otherwise specified in the plan, if a business rescue plan has 
been adopted and implemented, the creditor will lose the right to enforce any debt 
owed by the company.70 The concern with the interpretation of section 154 is whether 
the debt becomes unenforceable, is discharged, or whether it is extinguished. The 
distinction can be explained as follows: A debt becomes unenforceable when it is 
impossible for the creditor to enforce his claim; a claim is discharged when the 
company is released from its obligation to pay the debt; and extinguished means that 
the right has been either lost or abolished.71 Therefore, a creditor will lose its claim 
against the surety due to the fact that the principal debt has been discharged, if the 
business rescue plan provides for such a discharge.72 Should the business rescue 
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plan stipulate that the creditors will be paid in part, in full and final settlement, the 
principal debt will be extinguished and the sureties can no longer be held liable.73 
The accessory principle of the law of suretyship provides that the liability of a surety 
is accessory in nature, meaning that it is dependent on the validity and enforceability 
of the liability of the principal debtor.74 Therefore, for the suretyship agreement to be 
valid there must be a valid principal obligation between the principal debtor and the 
creditor75 as, should the principal obligation be discharged, released, or 
compromised, the same will happen to the accessory obligation.76 
In Niemand v Smith's Diary CC and Another77 the court considered section 154 and 
held that the creditor loses the right to recover any debt due once implementation of 
the business rescue plan has commenced.78 It added that the word ‘implement’ in 
section 154 could mean only commencement of implementation in that the creditor 
may enforce the debt due and payable to it to the degree provided for in the plan.79 In 
concluding the court held that because the business rescue plan, in the present case, 
had been properly adopted and its implementation had already commenced, the 
applicant had lost the right to continue with its proceedings based on section 154 of 
the Act.80 
2.4 Legal consequences for creditors 
One of the most important consequences of the commencement of business rescue 
proceedings is that it provides the company with extensive protection against legal 
action.81 This is achieved by placing a general moratorium on legal proceedings 
and/or executions against the company, its property, assets, and the application of 
the rights of all its creditors.82 However, certain legal proceedings are considered 
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exceptions and may be instituted during business rescue proceedings. These are: 
proceedings instituted to ‘set-off’ any claims made by the company in any legal 
proceedings;83 criminal proceedings against the company or any of its directors or 
officers;84 proceedings regarding the property or rights of the company where it is 
acting as a trustee;85 or proceedings by a regulatory authority in the performance of 
its duties after written notification has been given to the business rescue 
practitioner.86 
In an attempt to determine what effect a moratorium will have on a creditor’s right to 
enforce its claim against the sureties of a company, I examine Investec Bank Ltd v 
Bruyns.87 It is important to note that in this case, although the debtor company was 
placed under business rescue, there was no adopted and implemented business 
rescue plan in place. 
The pertinent facts were briefly that Investec Bank sought to enforce a surety given 
by Bruyns, who had bound himself as surety and co-principal debtor, for the 
company.88 The defendant (surety) argued that, in terms of section 132(1)(b), 
instituting the business rescue application caused the business proceedings to 
commence and for that reason the creditors’ application for summary judgment 
should be refused.89 The basis of its arguments included that: section 133(2) 
prohibits claims against parties who have executed suretyships in favour of a 
company in business rescue; the surety can claim the benefit of the moratorium 
afforded to the company; and that the amount of the principal debt is uncertain as it 
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may be compromised under an approved business rescue plan.90 Counsel for the 
defendant added that the court should not give section 133(2) its plain meaning 
because section 133(1) already provides a moratorium for claims against the 
company and a surety’s claim against a company is merely one example of a claim 
that would fall within the ambit of section 133(1).91 
Rogers AJ rejected the defendant’s argument and held that section 133(2) is not a 
replication of section 133(1), as section 133(2) is so clear-cut that it would be 
impossible to give it any interpretation other than its plain meaning.92 He continued to 
state that section 133(1) is regarded as a general provision which provides the 
company with protection against legal action on claims, except where written consent 
has been given by the business rescue practitioner or by a court.93 Section 133(2), 
on the other hand, is a special provision relating to the enforcement of claims against 
the company based on guarantees and suretyships, and specifies that it may only be 
enforced in such circumstances with leave of a court.94 The business rescue 
practitioner is not authorised to consent to the enforcement of claims against the 
company based on guarantees or suretyships.95 
The court referred to Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd & 
Another96 and distinguished between defences in personam and defences in rem97. A 
defence in personam affords the principal debtor a personal defence while leaving 
the debt intact, and may not be raised by the surety.98 A defence in rem, in contrast, 
attaches to the claim itself and strikes at the existence of the principal debt. This 
means that the defence must prove that the claim against the principal debtor is 
either invalid or has been extinguished or discharged.99 
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In the court’s view, the statutory moratorium in favour of a company under business 
rescue, is a defence in personam (personal privilege or benefit) and not one for the 
benefit of the surety.100 The court added that a business rescue plan may provide for 
the company to be released from its debts in whole or in part. 101 If a business rescue 
practitioner tables such a plan and it is approved by the required majority, an affected 
creditor may lose the right to enforce its claim.102 Furthermore, if a creditor were to 
sue a surety, there is always the possibility that the creditor may reach a compromise 
with the principal debtor, or that the principal debt may be discharged by way of 
payment.103 If the creditor secures judgment against the surety and the principal debt 
is later reduced or discharged, the creditor will still be able to claim the benefit of the 
discharge or a reduction in the debt.104  
Rogers AJ further stated that if the legislature intended to prohibit creditors from 
implementing their claims against the sureties of the company under rescue, it would 
have stated this.105 Such a prohibition could constitute a serious invasion of the rights 
of creditors, and currently there is no language in the Act which allows for such a 
prohibition.106 In conclusion, the court held that it could see no reason why the 
enforcement of claims against sureties should intrude on business rescue 
proceedings.107 The company would in any case have to face either the original 
creditor or the surety as its creditor, depending on the circumstances.108 The court 
granted the application for the summary judgment and held that the liability of 
sureties remains intact up to and until the adoption of a business rescue plan.109 
Niemand v Smith's Diary CC and Another110 also dealt with section 133. The facts 
here were briefly the following. The applicant launched an application based on 
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section 133(1)(b) of the Act claiming an amount of R736 873,12 from the first 
respondent.111 This was done subsequent to a written request to the business rescue 
practitioner seeking permission to proceed with the action and an application for 
summary judgment, but was rejected by the business rescue practitioner.112 The 
applicant requested permission from the court to proceed with the action, and if 
successful, to proceed with execution of the judgment.113 In interpreting section 
133(1)(b), the court stated this this particular section should be given a systematic 
interpretation.114 
Taking the systematic-interpretation approach into consideration, the court concluded 
that the applicant did not have the necessary locus standi to bring the application.115 
The court reasoned that the right of an affected person to obtain relief from the court 
is contained in the Act, but there is no such stipulation contained in section 133(1).116 
This case highlights the difference between section 133 and section 154 in that from 
the commencement of business rescue proceedings until the adoption of the 
business rescue plan, section 133 will apply. However, after the adoption of the 
business rescue plan, the consequences of section 154 will apply. 
2.5 The compromise procedure 
2.5.1 Introduction 
In terms of section 155, the board of the company or its liquidator (if the company is 
in the process of being wound up) may suggest an arrangement or compromise 
regarding its financial obligations to all of its creditors.117 A copy of the proposal 
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together with a notice of the meeting to consider the proposal must be delivered to 
every creditor.118 The proposal must also contain all the information reasonably 
required to enable the various creditors to decide whether to accept or reject the 
proposal.119 In order for the proposal for compromise to be adopted, a majority of the 
creditors, representing at least 75 per cent in value, must be present and vote in 
favour of the proposal.120 After successful adoption of the proposal, the court may 
sanction the compromise if it considers it just and equitable to do so.121 
2.5.2 Business rescue proceedings: Similarities and differences 
Both a compromise and business rescue proceedings share the aim of restructuring 
the financial affairs of a company.122 The distinction, however, lies in that with a 
compromise offer it is achieved without the participation of a business rescue 
practitioner; whereas under business rescue proceedings it involves a procedure for 
adopting and implementing a business rescue plan to rescue a financially distressed 
company with the assistance of a practitioner.123  
Compromise proceedings can be instituted irrespective of whether the company is 
financially distressed or not;124 while business rescue proceedings can only be 
instituted if a company is financially distressed.125 Furthermore, a compromise does 
not provide for a statutory moratorium which protects the company from claims by its 
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creditors; whereas business rescue proceedings do in fact afford the company 
protection against legal proceedings in the form of a statutory moratorium.126 
A compromise proposal will only be final and legally binding on all the company’s 
creditors from the date on which a copy of the court order is filed by the company 
with CIPC.127 Business rescue proceedings will either commence with the filing of the 
board’s resolution or when an affected party applies to court to commence business 
rescue proceedings.128 
Where a company enters into an arrangement or compromise with its creditors, the 
scheme of arrangement and compromise will not affect the liability of any surety of 
the company.129 It is important to note that this is not the case in business rescue 
proceedings as the Act has no similar provision safeguarding the creditor’s rights to 
hold the surety liable after the adoption of a business rescue plan.130 
2.6 The effect of business rescue proceedings on the liability of sureties: the 
positive law 
Since the adoption of the Act the position regarding the liability of sureties during 
business rescue proceedings has remained a somewhat contentious and much- 
discussed subject in that their position is currently uncertain. The fundamental 
reasons for this uncertainty can be drawn firstly, from the failure of the Act to address 
this specific topic; secondly,  the unclear wording of section 154(1) and specifically 
the meaning of the word ‘acceded’; and lastly, from conflicting judgments delivered 
by our courts of law. 
I highlight and evaluate the problem created by contradictory judgments by the 
various divisions of the High Court and what effect business rescue proceedings will 
have on the liability of the sureties of the company. These judgments can be broadly 
divided into two groups – those judgments in terms of which the liability of sureties 
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remains unaffected by the adoption of a business rescue plan; and those judgments 
that take the view that the introduction of business rescue proceedings has 
significantly changed the rights of a creditor to hold the surety of a company liable 
after the adoption of business rescue plan. 
2.6.1 Case law holding that creditors’ claims are preserved during business 
rescue proceedings 
In African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers 
(Pty) Ltd & Others131 the first respondent (Kariba) owed the applicant (African 
Banking Corporation) a sum of money which was secured by suretyships executed 
by the first respondent’s shareholders.132 The first respondent could not pay the debt 
and the shareholders decided voluntarily to place the company in business rescue.133 
Subsequently, a meeting in terms of section 151 was held at which the business 
rescue plan was approved and adopted.134 It is important to note that in the present 
case the court did not deal with section 154 of the Act but rather with section 153. 
Section 153 of the Act relates to the failure to adopt a business rescue plan. 
Kathree-Setiloane J stated that there is no provision in Chapter 6 of the Act indicating 
that the adoption of a business rescue plan will deprive creditors of their respective 
rights against sureties for the debts of the company in business rescue.135 In stating 
this, Kathree-Setiloane J deviated from the obiter dictum136 in the Investec case. In 
her view it would be harsh to deprive creditors of their rights against sureties137 and if 
the legislature intended an adopted business rescue plan to have so far-reaching 
consequences it would have expressly provided for it in legislation.138 Furthermore, 
no such a provision could be read into the business rescue administration139 as in her 
view the interests of sureties do not fall within the objective of the business rescue 
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administration.140 The court dismissed the application and held that the adoption of a 
business rescue plan will not affect a creditor’s claim against the surety for the debts 
of the company.141 A declaratory order was granted in terms of which the sureties 
remained liable for the company’s debts regardless of the existence of an approved 
and implemented business rescue plan which provided for the limitation of the 
creditors’ claims.142 This case highlights the fact that business rescue proceedings 
will not affect a creditor’s right of recourse against a surety of a company under 
business rescue. 
In the case of Blignaut v Stalcor (Pty) Ltd143 a creditor of a close corporation 
proceeded against the applicant (surety and co-principal debtor of the close 
corporation) for its full claim.144 Accordingly, the applicant brought an urgent 
application precluding the sale in execution of his primary residence.145 The adopted 
business rescue plan indicated that each of the creditors would forfeit 75 per cent of 
their claims against the debtor company.146 The sureties argued that the adoption of 
the business rescue plan amounted to a statutory compromise, available to the 
applicant as a defence in rem.147 They based their argument on the wording of 
section 154 of the Act148 and the decision in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire 
Equipment (Pty) Ltd & Another.149 
 
In response, counsel for the creditors argued that the compromise is not a defence in 
rem but rather purely a defence in personam in respect of the second respondent.150 
Furthermore, he drew the court’s attention to the definition of business rescue in the 
Act and stated that it is clear from the latter that it is a defence in personam which 
attaches to the applicable company under business rescue.151 The court agreed with 
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this submission and said that it should attempt to establish the true intention of the 
legislature.152 
 
Acting Judge Pohl rejected the sureties’ arguments and held that the purpose of 
business rescue is to provide a financially distressed company with the opportunity to 
get back onto its ‘financial feet’.153 The court added that it could not have been the 
intention of the legislature to embrace sureties and co-principal debtors as 
beneficiaries within the structure of business rescue proceedings and also give them 
the same benefit of a discharge that the company obtains in terms of section 154 
once a plan has been approved154. The application was dismissed with costs and the 
sureties remained liable for the full amount of the debt irrespective of the compromise 
which existed between the creditor and the debtor company.155 
 
In New Port Finance Company (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nedbank Limited156 sureties 
for the company applied for an interdict preventing the creditor (Nedbank) from taking 
steps against them for amounts owed to it.157 These amounts were secured by a 
deed of suretyship.158 It is important to note that in the present case the judgment 
was obtained before the adoption of the business rescue plan. 
 
The sureties argued that because the debtor company’s liability had been altered by 
the business rescue plan, the sureties’ liability had also been altered.159 
Unfortunately, the business rescue attempt failed and was terminated.160 However, 
the court acknowledged the importance of the legal aspects thereof and provided 
reasons why the sureties’ arguments had failed.161 It pointed out that the judgments 
obtained against the sureties secured their liability and there were no grounds for 
rescinding these judgments, nor had there been any attempt to do so;162 the creditor 
had, before the onset of the dispute, taken judgment against the principal debtor and 
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sureties which established their joint and several liability;163 and finally, there was no 
authority for the claim that a compromise of the principal debtor’s liability would 
accumulate to the benefit of a surety after judgment had been taken164. 
 
The deed of suretyship was drafted in such a way that it permitted the creditor to 
pursue action against the sureties irrespective of their dealings with the principal 
debtors;165 if the deed of suretyship provided for any instances where the principal 
debtors would be released from their obligations, it would not prohibit the respondent 
from recovering any outstanding amount from the sureties.166 
 
The suretyship agreement in the present case contained clauses in terms of which 
the creditor would be entitled to recover the full amount of debt from the sureties 
irrespective of the release of the principal debtor from its liability.167 In considering the 
contents of the business rescue plan, the court stated that the creditor was entitled to 
recover the full amount from the sureties although the plan reduced the debtor 
company’s liability.168 
Counsel for the sureties drew the court’s attention to the judgment by Rogers J in 
Tuning Fork where he made the obiter dictum that in business rescue proceedings 
the common-law principles of suretyship apply as the Act is silent on this issue.169 
This means that a surety is released if the principal debt is discharged by reason of a 
compromise with or a release of, the principal debtor.170 Wallis J disagreed pointing 
out that the obiter dictum made no sense to him.171 He stated that Moti and Co v 
Cassim’s Trustee172 was decided on the interpretation of the 1916 Insolvency Act173 
which has no direct counterpart in the Act.174 The court referred to section 154 and 
stated that its subsection 1 simply states that in certain circumstances a creditor will 
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not be able to enforce debts against a company in business rescue.175 Whereas 
subsection 2 provides that a company may enforce a debt to the extent permitted by 
the contents of the business rescue plan.176 Should that be the case it would mean 
that the surety’s liability would be unaffected by business rescue, unless the business 
rescue plan provides for a different position.177 In his view, section 154 can be 
construed as dealing only with the ability to sue the principal debtor and not with the 
existence of the debt.178 The court rejected the sureties’ application for an interdict 
and held that where a judgment has already been granted against sureties before the 
start of the business rescue proceedings, the sureties’ liability will be unaffected by 
the proceedings.179 
In ABSA Bank Limited v Haremza180 the defendant bound herself jointly and 
severally as surety and co-principal debtor in favour of the plaintiff (ABSA Bank).181 
The company was placed in business rescue after which an amended business 
rescue plan was adopted by the creditors.182 The business rescue plan stipulated 
that the company would be sold as a going concern and the plaintiff, as secured 
creditor, would receive payment to the full extent of the realisation of its securities.183 
Furthermore, clause 6.4 of the plan provided that the sale of the company’s assets 
would be paid to the creditors in settlement of all claims against the respective legal 
entities, and in full and final settlement of the creditors’ claims.184 An important term 
in the plan was clause 6.5 which provided that the settlement was not intended to 
affect any rights that a creditor may have against any third party who bound itself as 
surety.185 
Relying on the judgment in Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio v Greeff,186 
counsel for the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s claim against the company had 
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been extinguished under section 154, and that she could not be held liable for the 
accessory obligation arising from the deed of suretyship.187 
Bozalek J, after considering the judgment of Tuning Fork, made the obiter dictum that 
Rogers J’s perception is that the surety of a principal debtor will be released by a 
compromise or business rescue plan unless the deed of surety provides otherwise, 
or the claim against the surety is secured in the business rescue plan.188 This 
approach was questioned by the court in New Port Finance which stated that section 
154 could be interpreted to deal only with the ability to sue the principal debtor and 
not with the existence of the debt itself.189 Bozalek J said if this were true, the liability 
of the surety would be unaffected by the business rescue plan, unless it made 
specific provision for the position of sureties.190 She added that were she to apply the 
approach in Tuning Fork to the present matter, the defendant would remain liable as 
surety because of suretyship’s specific terms, and/or by reason of the terms in the 
business rescue plan which preserved the creditor’s rights of recourse against the 
surety.191 
The court gave the following reasons for its interpretation. Firstly, the deed of 
suretyship provided for a wide range of circumstances (judicial management, 
administration, compromise or arrangement) and these circumstances, in the court’s 
view, could be seen to encompass a business rescue plan.192 Secondly, clause 8.1.1 
of the deed of suretyship allowed the plaintiff to reach a compromise as regards its 
claim against the principal debtor by way of an arrangement without forfeiting its 
rights against the surety.193 Thirdly, the plaintiff’s right to proceed against the 
defendant was supported by the wording of clause 6.3 which permitted the plaintiff, 
without prejudice to its rights, to enter into any arrangement, compromise or 
settlement.194 
The court therefore rejected the defendant’s arguments and stated that the parties in 
the present matter had agreed to the settlement, concluded by way of the business 
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rescue plan, which provided that it was not intended to affect any rights that a 
creditor may have against any third party who bound itself as surety.195 Further, the 
agreement between the plaintiff and the company was nothing more than a pactum 
de non petendo196 providing that the surety preserved her right of recourse against 
the principal debtor.197 Clause 6.4 of the business rescue plan, which read on its 
own, could be seen as an unconditional discharge or release subject only to the 
payment of dividends, and would result in the accessory obligation being 
extinguished.198 But, in the light of the contents of clause 6.5, clause 6.4 cannot be 
read alone, and for that reason it must be construed as a pactum de non petendo 
preserving the plaintiff’s right to proceed against the sureties.199 The court granted 
the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment200. 
The most recent case law on the issue of the liability of sureties during business 
rescue proceedings is the unreported case of Stan Rio Pipe and Steel (Pty) Ltd v 
Esterhuizen.201 Here the plaintiff (creditor) instituted action against the defendant as 
surety and co-principal debtor based on an application for credit facilities, including a 
deed of suretyship.202 
The defendant resisted the applicant’s application and argued that the contract of 
suretyship was invalid due to its non-compliance with section 6 of the General Law 
Amendment Act, and also because the name of the principal debtor was not 
recorded therein.203  The defendant further alleged that the plaintiff’s action was mala 
fide and premature as it had already accepted the business rescue plan.204 
The court’s attention was drawn to section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act 
which states that the Act requires certain essential terms to be embodied in a 
contract of suretyship.205 The defendant contended that the current contract of surety 
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lacked one of these essential terms – the identity of the principal debtor – and that 
this rendered the suretyship invalid.206 
Counsel for the plaintiff rejected this argument and contended that the deed of 
suretyship, which formed part of the application form, constituted a single 
document.207 Also, the principal debt was clearly identifiable and for that reason there 
had been compliance with section 6 despite the blank space where the name of the 
principal debtor should have appeared.208 
The court was faced with two pertinent issues: the validity of the deed of suretyship; 
and the liability of the surety under the business rescue plan. 
Firstly, on the issue of the validity of the deed of suretyship, the court stated that it 
was satisfied that the deed of suretyship complied with section 6 of the General Law 
Amendment Act.209 It provided the following reasons for its decision: the defendant 
signed the deed of suretyship which clearly indicated his capacity as surety and co-
principal debtor;210 and secondly, in considering the contents of this document, 
clause 6 provided that any party who signed on behalf of the purchaser (Sansu Steel) 
binds itself as surety and co-principal debtor in solidum in favour of the seller (Stan 
Rio Pipe and Steel (Pty) Ltd).211. 
In respect of the second issue relating to the liability of the surety under the business 
rescue plan, counsel for the defendant submitted that once a business rescue plan 
has been adopted, it provides a defence in rem for the surety.212 He supported his 
argument by referring to the judgment by Rogers J in Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A 
Balanced Audio v Greeff.213 
In contrast, counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the liability of the surety is 
unaffected by the business rescue plan214 and relied upon the judgment by Wallis J 
in New Port Finance Company (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nedbank Limited.215 
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The court accepted the plaintiff’s submission and held that its right to sue the surety 
under the deed of suretyship remained unaffected by the business rescue plan.216 
The reasons for its judgment included that reliance by the defendant on the case of 
Tuning Fork was inappropriate, and that New Port was a case in point.217 The court 
indicated that there was no merit in the defendant’s argument that it was never the 
intention of the parties that it would be personally liable for the principal debtor’s 
liabilities.218 The language used in both the sale agreement and in the deed of surety 
was very clear and by admitting to having signed an application for credit, the 
defendant had renounced a defence of excussion.219 
The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff on the basis that the 
defendant had failed to raise a bona fide defence.220 
2.6.2 Case law holding that Creditors lose their claims during business rescue 
proceedings 
A conflicting judgment disagreeing with the decision by Kathree-Setiloane J in African 
Banking, was delivered by Gorven J in DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz 
NO.221  In this particular case the applicant applied to set aside a resolution by the 
board to commence with business rescue proceedings.222 The business rescue plan 
provided for the discharge of 75 per cent of the creditor’s claims.223 
In considering the validity of the business rescue plan the court referred to the 
moratorium in favour of the company which deprives creditors of the power to 
enforce their claims against the company.224 This, in the court’s view, provided for a 
legislative intervention into existing law which deprives creditors of their rights.225 It is 
a well-known principle in our law that the legislature does not intend to change 
existing law more than is necessary – particularly if to do so would extinguish existing 
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rights.226 Currently there is a presumption against any forfeiture of rights and any 
provisions purporting to do so must be interpreted restrictively.227 The court referred 
to the obiter dictum in Koen & another v Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate 
(Pty) Ltd & others228 where the court stated that the mere institution of business 
rescue proceedings significantly affects the rights of third parties to enforce their 
rights against the company.229 
Gorven J stated that African Banking was incorrect in stating that the offeree is 
adequately protected since it cannot receive less than it would have had the 
company been liquidated.230 The court added that the common law provides that the 
cession of a guaranteed claim brings with it the right to enforce the claim against both 
the principal debtor and the surety.231 The cedent will lose this right because it has 
unavoidably ceded its claim against the principal debtor, and also because suretyship 
is an accessory obligation.232 
In examining the business rescue plan, Gorven J drew the inference that because 
the claims of the creditors had been ceded and the latter was silent as regards the 
right of the cessionary to enforce the deed of suretyship, the creditors would not be 
able to hold the sureties liable if the plan were to be adopted and implemented.233 
The court added that section 154 provides that a business rescue plan may only 
deprive a creditor of its right to enforce its claim, if that creditor has assented to 
discharge all or part of the debt.234 Where the plan provides for more than voluntary 
discharge of a whole or part of the debt, it is not considered valid.235 The business 
rescue plan, in the present matter, stated that all the creditors would lose part of their 
claim, if the plan were to be adopted, irrespective of whether or not they had voted in 
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favour of the plan.236 Even more drastic, they would lose the right to attempt to 
recover part of their debt from the sureties.237  
In conclusion, the court found that the effect of the business rescue plan in this 
matter would be that the sureties would escape liability for 75 per cent of the claims 
ceded.238 But what is the legal position regarding the remaining 25 per cent of the 
claims? The fact that the business rescue plan provided for the discharge of 75 per 
cent of the creditor’s claims meant that they would receive only that percentage of 
their claims and would be precluded from claiming the remaining 25 per cent from the 
sureties. 
The court added that once the business rescue plan has been adopted, the creditors 
of the company can no longer hold the sureties liable as their claims have been 
ceded and the Act does not preserve the right of the cessionary to enforce a 
suretyship agreement.239 
In ABSA Bank Limited v Du Toit and Others240 the applicant applied for summary 
judgment against the defendants (sureties) of the company based on various loans it 
had advanced to the principal debtor.241 The principal debtor was placed under 
business rescue and the adopted business rescue plan provided that the amount 
paid to the applicant from the principal debtor would be in ‘full and final settlement’.242 
The business rescue plan contained two specific provisions: that the amounts made 
available for payment to creditors in terms of the business rescue plan, would be paid 
in ‘full and final settlement’ of any and all claims of the creditors;243 and that the 
settlement was not intended to affect any rights that any creditor may have against 
any third party who had bound itself as surety.244 
The defendants opposed the application firstly on the basis that the liabilities of the 
sureties were accessory in nature and that the defendant’s liability was conditional on 
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the existence of the principal obligation.245 Secondly, they argued that the business 
rescue plan, specifically in paragraph 6.4, extinguished the principal debtor’s debt 
which also released the sureties from their liability.246 The defendants submitted that 
insofar the applicant had lost the right to enforce the principal debt against the 
company, it was excluded from enforcing the principal debt against the sureties.247 
They alleged that although the business rescue plan attempted to retain ABSA’s right 
of recourse against the defendants as sureties, they were not themselves parties to 
the business rescue plan.248 
The applicant claimed that the adoption and implementation of the business rescue 
plan would not affect any of the creditors’ rights against any surety for and on behalf 
of the principal debtor, and also that their claims had been extinguished.249 The 
applicant drew the court’s attention to the judgment by Kathree-Setiloane J in African 
Banking where the judge stated that Chapter 6 contains no express provision that the 
adoption of a business rescue plan will deprive creditors of their right against sureties 
for the debts of a company in business rescue.250 If the legislature intended an 
adopted business rescue plan to have so far-reaching consequences, it would have 
expressly provided for this in legislation.251 Counsel for the defendant pointed out that 
African Banking did not deal with section 154 and therefore differs from the present 
case.252 
Saldanha J agreed with the defendant’s arguments, and in particular that section 154 
does not extinguish a third party’s liability to a principal debtor, as it is possible to 
conclude a separate agreement to obtain a guarantee continuing the liabilities of the 
principal debtor.253 Furthermore, the business rescue plan can stipulate that the 
principal debt is not discharged which will mean that the creditor retains its right of 
recourse against the surety.254 The court accordingly found in favour of the 
defendants (sureties) stating that they had raised a bona fide defence. The creditors 
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therefore lost their right to enforce their suretyships as it was based on the existence 
of the principal debt.255 The application for summary judgment was dismissed.256 
In Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio v Greeff257 the facts were briefly that the 
debtor company purchased audio and visual equipment from the plaintiff which was 
subsequently placed in business rescue.258 A business rescue plan was adopted 
which indicated that the creditors would receive a dividend of 28,2 cents in the rand 
in ‘full and final’ settlement’ of their claims.259 After the adoption of the business 
rescue plan, but before its implementation, the creditors applied for summary 
judgment against the sureties.260 The sureties opposed the application and argued 
that the creditors’ compromise, which was contained in the business rescue plan, 
released them from their liability.261 
Rogers J accepted the sureties’ argument and summary judgment was refused.262 
The court held that the common law applies because of the lacuna in the Act as 
regards the right of a creditor to hold a surety of the principal debtor liable after the 
creditor’s claims have been settled in full in the adoption and implementation of a 
business rescue plan.263 He added that as the principal debt had been discharged in 
the business rescue plan and the creditor’s rights against the sureties were not 
preserved in either the surety agreement or the business rescue plan, the sureties 
had been released from their liability.264 
The court based its decision on the following: the application of the well-known test in 
terms of which a term that is read into a statute, cannot be used to imply a term in the 
business rescue provisions;265 the general principles of the law of suretyship must be 
applied to determine what effect the provisions in the business rescue plan will have 
on sureties;266 the common-law principles of suretyship state that a surety is 
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accessory267 in nature, meaning once the principal obligation has been discharged by 
a compromise or the release of the principal debtor, the surety will also be released, 
unless the deed of suretyship or the business rescue plan provides otherwise;268 and 
lastly, if the business rescue plan provides for the discharge of the principal debt 
without preserving the claim against the surety, the surety will be discharged.269 
Rogers J examined the compromise procedure270 and related it to his earlier 
judgment in Investec271 where he had held that the moratorium is a defence in 
personam available to the financially distressed company and cannot be relied upon 
by the surety.272 Comparing the present case with Investec, Rogers J held that in the 
present case the moratorium had been displaced by the release of the company 
against payment to the concurrent creditors of the specified dividend in ‘full and final’ 
settlement of their claims.273 The plaintiff submitted that the legislature would not 
have intended the surety to be discharged simply because the principal debtor had 
been released from the claim on the basis of a provision in the business rescue 
plan.274 
The court stated that in its view a distinction should be drawn between the legal 
consequence dictated by statute, and that of the common law in response to a 
‘statutory event’.275 If the statute governs a position, it must be applied irrespective of 
what the common-law provides.276 If the statute does not address the matter, we 
should turn to the common law for an answer.277 
In its judgment the court suggested five possibilities for how the legislature could deal 
with the position of sureties.278 The first is where the creditors retain their claims 
against the sureties, who in return have a right of recourse for their respective claims 
against the company.279 The second option is that creditors are able to hold sureties 
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liable, and the sureties will forfeit their claims against the company.280 Thirdly, the 
creditor cedes his claim to the surety to enforce during business rescue.281 The fourth 
option involves retaining the current model in terms of which the parties negotiate 
their positions in provisions in the business rescue plan.282 The final option is that the 
parties conclude an agreement setting out the liability of sureties during business 
rescue proceedings.283 
Rogers J went on to look at the decision in Moti and Co v Cassim’s Trustee’s284 
which relates to the accessory principle in the discharge of the principal debtor by a 
release or compromise.285 The majority in Moti held that relieving the debtor of its 
debts would result in the surety also being released from its obligation, even if the 
law does not so provide.286 The court referred to Forsyth & Caney’s Law of 
Suretyship which provides that as the obligation of a surety is accessory in nature, if 
the principal obligation is extinguished the surety’s obligation will also be 
extinguished.287 
In examining section 150(2), Rogers J stated that a business rescue plan is not 
required to provide for the release of the company from the payment of its debts, it 
should merely explain the degree of the proposed release.288 Determining whether 
the defendants have been discharged will depend largely on the terms of the adopted 
business rescue plan.289 Sections 154(1) and section 154(2) were considered and 
the court found that these two sections overlap.290 These sections could be 
considered irrelevant in the light of section 152(4) which provides that an adopted 
business rescue plan is binding on the company and all its creditors, irrespective of 
whether they were present, voted at the meeting, or proved a claim.291 Rogers J 
stated that the business rescue plan contained no provisions preserving the creditor’s 
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rights against the sureties, and, therefore, there was no basis for implying such a 
provision.292 
The judge referred to the judgment in African Banking where it was held that there is 
no express provision in Chapter 6 of the Act which provides that an adopted business 
rescue plan will deprive creditors of their respective rights against sureties for the 
debts of the company in business rescue.293 She agreed with the statement, but 
believed there was also no provision in the Act which preserves rights against 
sureties.294 Whether the adopted business rescue will affect the creditor’s right 
against a surety will depend largely on the application of the common-law principles 
of the law of suretyship to the actual provisions of the business rescue plan.295 
In conclusion, Rogers J stated that the Act specifically provides that a business 
rescue plan may include provisions relating to the release of the company from its 
debts and, therefore, the effect of such a release must be determined by taking the 
common-law principles of the law of suretyship into account.296 She added that it 
would also be desirable if the legislature were to amend the Act to clarify the current 
position.297 The application for summary judgment was refused.298 
2.7 Conclusion 
The Companies Act299 has introduced a new corporate rescue regime into South 
African law aimed at providing a financially distressed company with the opportunity 
to recover financially and to continue operating on a solvent basis.300 But Chapter 
6301 of the Act – which contains the business rescue provisions – fails to address 
certain issues. One of these relates to whether creditors lose their claims against 
sureties of the company while the company is under business rescue, and what 
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effect an adopted business rescue plan will have on a creditor’s right of recourse 
against sureties of the company. 
The legal position governing the liability of sureties must be approached having 
regard to the positions before and after the adoption of the business rescue plan. The 
position before the adoption of the business rescue plan is clear: Investec Bank v 
Bruyns302 has established that a surety’s liability remains intact up to and until the 
adoption of the business rescue plan.303 However, the position after the approval and 
adoption of a business rescue plan is uncertain and has been left to the courts to 
resolve.304  The courts have adopted diametrically opposing views holding either that 
sureties are liable,305 or they are exempt306 from liability. 
To further complicate the issue, the legislature has couched section 154 in unclear 
terms through its choice of the word ‘acceded’. 
Section 154(1) provides that a business rescue plan may contain a provision or 
provisions in terms of which a creditor who has ‘acceded’ to the discharge of the 
whole or part of the debt owing to that creditor, will lose the right to enforce the debt 
or part of it.307 Considering the wording of section 154(1), it allows for the 
interpretation that in certain circumstances a creditor will not be able to enforce its 
debt against a company in business rescue.308 But what happens where that creditor 
does not accede to the business rescue plan? In DH Brothers309 the court reacted to 
this question by stating that a business rescue plan may only specify that a creditor 
who has acceded to the discharge of the whole or part of the debt, may be deprived 
of its rights to enforce its claims.310 Where the business rescue plan provides for 
                                                             
302
 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC). For a detailed discussion of this case refer to paragraph 2.4 of this 
dissertation. 
303
 Investec at paras 25 & 26. 
304
 http://www.fluxmans.com/news/display.asp?id=147&year=2015. 
305
 For case law where sureties remained liable refer to African Banking Corporation of Botswana 
Limited v Kariba Furniture Manufactures (Pty) Ltd & Others 2013 (6) SA 471 GNP; Blignaut v Stalcor 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (6) SA 398 (FB); New Port Finance Company (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Nedbank Limited 2016 (5) SA 503 (SCA); ABSA Bank Limited v Haremza 2015 ZAWCHC 73. 
306
 For case law where sureties were exempt from liability refer to DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v 
Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (KZP); ABSA Bank Limited v Du Toit and Others 2013 
ZAWCHC 194; Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd t/a Balanced Audio v Greeff and Another 2014 (4) SA 521 WCC; 
Stan Rio Pipe and Steel (Pty) Ltd v Esterhuizen (64166/2015) [2016] ZAGPPHC 35. 
307
 Section 154(1). 
308
 Newport at para 14. 
309
 2014 (1) SA 103 (KZP). 
310
 DH Brothers at para 67. 
42 
more than voluntary discharge of a whole or part of the debt, it is not considered 
valid.311 
The wording of section 154(2) “not entitled to enforce any debt owed by the 
company…unless provided for in the business rescue plan” creates the impression 
that if the business rescue plan has been adopted and implemented the creditor will 
lose its right of recourse, unless it is preserved by the business rescue plan312.  
In New Port Finance the court considered section 154 and found that it could be 
interpreted to deal only with the ability to sue the principal debtor, and not the 
existence of the debt itself.313 If one considers this interpretation, it boils down to the 
liability of the surety being unaffected by the business rescue, unless the business 
rescue plan itself makes specific provision for the position of sureties.314 
A further concern with the interpretation of section 154 is whether the debt becomes 
unenforceable, or is discharged or extinguished.315  
The legislature’s choice of the word ‘acceded’ has also raised considerable debate. 
In Tuning Fork the court criticised the use of this word as inappropriate, and found 
that the legislature could not have intended that the discharge would depend on the 
creditor acceding to the plan or not.316 
Some light can, however, be found in section 155(9) which provides that when a 
company enters into a compromise with its creditors, it will not affect the liability of 
any surety of the company.317 But the compromise mentioned in section 154 must 
not be confused with a compromise by a company in terms of section 155(9).318 
Therefore, in light of the conflicting judgments and unclear legislation, the position 
remains uncertain. No doubt there will still be much deliberation and new case law on 
this issue. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SURETYSHIP UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the concept of suretyship whilst evaluating 
the current position of sureties during business rescue proceedings in terms of the 
Act. I do not provide an historical background of suretyship but restrict my discussion 
to the aspects highlighted and the relevance of the principles governing surety within 
the aims of this study. 
 
The following aspects of suretyship are considered: 
- Definition of a contract of suretyship. 
- Nature of a contract of suretyship. 
- The accessory nature of the surety’s obligation. 
- Formalities of a contract of suretyship. 
- Suretyship versus guarantee. 
- Liability of the surety. 
- Insolvency of the principal debtor or surety. 
- Defence actions and right of recourse available to the surety. 
 
3.2 Definition of a contract of suretyship 
The authors of Caney’s Law of Suretyship319 provide a well-drafted definition of a 
contract of suretyship: “Suretyship is an accessory contract by which a person (the 
surety) undertakes to the creditor of another (the principal debtor), that the principal 
debtor, who remains bound, will perform his obligation to the creditor and that if and 
so far as the principal debtor fails to do so, the surety will perform it or, failing that, 
indemnify the creditor”. I chose this specific definition based on the support it has 
received from various Appellate Divisions.320 
                                                             
319
 Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 28-9. See also Pretorius (2012) 75 THRHR, pp. 189-205, 2012 186-
7; Stoop & Kelly-Louw 2011 PELJ 72. 
320
 Refer to Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Frysch 1977 3 SA 562 (A) 584F; Sapirstein v Anglo African 
Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 4 SA 1 (A) 11H; Nedbank Ltd v Van Zyl 1990 2 SA 469 (A) 473I in Forsyth 
& Pretorius Suretyship 28. See also Stoop & Kelly-Louw 2011 PELJ 72. 
44 
3.3 Nature of a contract of suretyship 
From this definition it can clearly be established that suretyship is accessory to a 
valid principal obligation321 in that it depends on the existence, or coming into 
existence, of the obligation it secures.322 Several parties are involved in a contract of 
suretyship: the creditor (person to whom the debt is owed); principal debtor (person 
who must pay the creditor or comply with its obligations); and the surety (person 
undertaking the principal debtor’s obligation).323 The surety undertakes its obligation 
to the creditor324 of another. This means that the surety and the principal debtor 
cannot be the same person.325 The relationship between a debtor and creditor and a 
resulting obligation can be formed by a contract, delict, or any other legal cause by 
which a person becomes bound to another as a debtor.326 
3.4 The accessory nature of the surety’s obligation 
Suretyship is a form of personal security327 which is accessory to the principal 
obligation.328 This means that for the suretyship to be valid, there must be a valid 
principal obligation between the debtor and the creditor.329 The principal obligation 
can arise before the suretyship is undertaken, or even where the surety undertakes 
liability in respect of a future obligation.330 This position was confirmed in GA 
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Odendal v Structured Mezzanine Investments331 where the court acknowledged that 
a contract of suretyship is accessory in nature as there must be a valid principal 
obligation between the debtor and the creditor. In its judgment the court referred to 
the position in Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Frysch332 where Corbett JA stated that the 
principal obligation need not exist when the suretyship contract is entered into as the 
suretyship contract can refer to a principal obligation that will only come into 
existence in the future.333 However, should there be no principal obligation – for 
example the apparent obligation is based on forgery or an illegal transaction334 – no 
suretyship contract will have been concluded and the surety will not be liable under 
the void contract of suretyship.335 African Life Property Holdings v Score Food 
Holdings336 confirmed this where Nienaber JA compared guaranteeing a non-existent 
debt with the pointless act of multiplying by nought. 
 
3.4.1 Accessory principle and business rescue proceedings 
The accessory principle of suretyship does not, by operation of law, automatically 
apply to the relationship between a creditor and a surety as both parties will have to 
agree to its application to their relationship.337 If the parties agree that the accessory 
principle does not apply to their relationship, it can be assumed that they intended a 
guarantee rather than a suretyship agreement.338 
This principle has caused numerous problems in business rescue proceedings. The 
common-law principles regarding suretyship provide that the liability of a surety 
depends on the existence of a principal debt.339 Therefore, if the principal debt is 
extinguished, the liability of the surety will also be extinguished.340. The first contact 
between the common law and the new business rescue proceedings was in the 
matter of African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture 
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Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd & Others341 where the court held that business rescue 
proceedings do not affect a creditor’s right of recourse against a surety of a company 
in business rescue342. 
In Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio v Greeff343 the court considered the 
interaction between the liabilities of sureties and the accessory principle. Rogers J 
stated that a distinction should be drawn between the legal consequences dictated 
by statute, and those of the common law in response to a ‘statutory event’.344 If the 
statute governs a position, it must be applied irrespective of what the common-law 
provides.345 If the statute does not address the matter, an answer should be sought 
in the common law.346 The court referred to Moti and Co v Cassim’s Trustee347 where 
the majority of the full bench held that the surety had been released from his 
obligations to perform.348 Rogers J argued that because the Act is silent on the right 
of a creditor to hold a surety of the principal debtor liable, the common law applies, 
unless the deed of suretyship or the business rescue plan state otherwise.349 In 
applying the common-law principles the court held that the principal debt had been 
discharged in the business rescue plan since the creditor’s rights had not been 
preserved by way of the deed of suretyship or the adopted business rescue plan.350 
This resulted in the sureties being released from their liabilities.351 
3.5 Formalities for a contract of suretyship 
Suretyship is a consensual contract352 which arises from an agreement between the 
creditor and the surety353 (in his personal capacity) subject to the requirements for 
the formation of valid contract.354 Accordingly, anyone who is legally capable of 
contracting can bind themselves as surety, except where a surety is not capable of 
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entering into a contract, as this will cause the suretyship to be invalid355. In 
concluding the contract the parties must have a justa causa (intention) for entering 
into a binding contract of suretyship.356 In addition to the intention, the essential 
terms to the agreement must also be ascertainable from the content of the contract of 
suretyship.357 It is important to note that the principal debtor need not be a party358 to 
the contract of suretyship and therefore it can be formed without his knowledge or 
consent.359 Before June 1956, the common law360 did not prescribe whether a 
contract of suretyship had to be in writing or propose any particular form for its 
conclusion.361 
Currently section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act362 necessitates that the 
terms of a contract of suretyship must be in writing363 and signed by or on behalf of 
both the surety364 and the creditor365 for it to be a valid and enforceable 
agreement.366 This was confirmed by the Appellate Division in Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v 
Maddison367 where the court held that section 6 obliges the surety to sign a written 
document which represents the contract of suretyship.368 The Appellate Division 
provided numerous reasons why the legislature adopted section 6 of the General 
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Law Amendment Act. Miller JA specified that one of these was to establish the true 
terms to which the parties had agreed and so avoid or minimise the likelihood of 
untruthfulness, fraud, or unnecessary legal action.369 It is important to note that the 
surety does not have to be a party to a business rescue plan or an agreement in 
terms which the principal debt is settled or a compromise is reached since suretyship 
is accessory to the principal obligation and the surety’s right of recourse only arises 
when the principal debtor fails to pay the creditor. 
In Sapirstein & Others v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd370 the Appellate Division 
laid down the essentialia371 of a contract of suretyship:372 the identity of the 
creditor;373 the identity of the principal debtor;374 the identity of the surety;375 and the 
nature and amount of principal debt.376 As a general rule, these essential terms must 
be in writing377 and embodied in the written document. Failure to do so would give 
rise to non-compliance with section 6 and cause the contract to be void.378 Where the 
essential terms cannot be established by reference to the written document, the 
courts may use extrinsic evidence to identify them.379 Moreover, should the parties to 
the contract of suretyship decide on any amendments to its terms, these will have to 
be made in writing to comply with both the formalities required by contract law and by 
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the General Law Amendment Act.380 An oral variation of a suretyship contract will not 
be permitted as it will not comply with section 6.381 However, the parties can agree to 
the oral cancellation of the agreement.382 
3.6 Suretyship and the contract of guarantee 
I discussed the nature of suretyship earlier in this chapter. A contract of guarantee is 
considered to arise where the guarantor assumes a principal obligation to indemnify 
the promisee on the occurrence of certain events.383 From this it is clear that a 
contract of guarantee does not depend on the existence of any other debt or 
agreement,384 unlike a contract of suretyship385.  
Lubbe386 illustrates their distinct natures as follows: the guarantor’s obligation, which 
is independent of that of the debtor, is to indemnify the creditor as a result of the 
debtor’s non-performance.387 Whereas, the surety is only liable for losses ensuing 
from the debtor’s non-performance388. Secondly, the surety undertakes that the 
debtor will perform, and only if he fails to perform, will the surety perform in his 
place.389 In the case of a guarantee the guarantor agrees to pay on the occurrence of 
a certain event, but does not give an assurance that the event will not occur.390 If the 
debtor’s contract is invalid – for whatsoever reason – the guarantor’s responsibility 
will remain in force and he will still be liable to pay, while the surety’s responsibility 
will be extinguished and he will have to pay nothing.391 The matter of List v 
Jungers392 is still used as precedent when a distinction between contracts of 
guarantee and suretyship has to be made. In this case the Appellate Division held 
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that the words ‘guarantee’ and ‘warrant’ have an assortment of meanings and their 
exact meaning must be established from the particular context in which they are 
used.393 The court agreed with the view of Greenberg J in Walker’s Fruit Farms Ltd v 
Sumner394 where he stated that the word ‘guarantee’ is itself capable of a number of 
meanings, but if you adopt its ordinary meaning it means to assure a person of 
receipt or possession of something.395 
The advantage of a creditor using a guarantee rather than suretyship to secure his 
claim, is that it will be entitled to proceed with its claim against the guarantor, as it will 
be unaffected by the business rescue proceedings, the plan, or the clarification of 
section 154.396 In order to protect the rights of creditors, the authors Swart and 
Lombard397 have proposed the following: creditors should consider using other forms 
of personal security and the deed of suretyship should be correctly phrased to 
preserve the creditor’s right against the provider of security independently of the 
business rescue plan.398 
3.7 Liability of the surety 
The general position in practice is that should the principal debtor fail to pay or to pay 
in full, the creditor can hold the surety liable for payment.399 Thereafter, the surety will 
have a right of recourse against the debtor.400 The surety’s obligation together with its 
liability is limited to the obligation it has undertaken401 and originates from the 
moment that the principal debtor defaults in execution of its principal obligations.402 
This was illustrated in Trans-Drakensberg Bank Ltd v Guy403 where Miller J stated 
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that where the surety has agreed to an amount or cause, its liability will be limited to 
the amount or cause as stated in the contract of suretyship.404  
The surety’s liability cannot exceed that of the debtor, but can be equivalent to it or 
even lower.405 This principle was confirmed in Wessels v The Master of the High 
Court406 where the court held that when a surety binds itself for more than the 
debtor’s obligation, it will only be liable to the extent of the obligation. In proving the 
amount of the principal debtor’s indebtedness, the suretyship may stipulate that a 
certificate of indebtedness be provided.407 If the principal debt is for an undefined408 
amount, the surety’s liability to pay the amount is secured once this amount has been 
determined409 and secured by a judgment of the court.410  
The surety cannot be held liable for the debt until it is actually due by the principal 
debtor.411 Therefore, in essence the surety’s liability is conditional in that it will only 
be liable towards the creditor in the event of a breach of contract by the principal 
debtor.412 Depending on the terms of the contract of suretyship, where the surety has 
bound itself only to a stated amount, it cannot be held liable for any interest, should it 
be charged against the debtor.413 But this situation changes when the surety places 
itself in mora414 as it will then be liable for interest, provided that the interest does not 
exceed the capital amount.415 In the final analysis, the surety will only be liable for 
what is stipulated in the contract of suretyship.416 
As pointed out, the surety and the principal debtor cannot be the same person,417 but 
is it is possible for a surety to bind itself as both surety and co-principal debtor418 by 
expressly stipulating this in the contract of suretyship.419 The key distinction between 
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the liability of a surety and the liability where the surety has also bound itself as co-
principal debtor, is illustrated in the case of Neon and Cold Cathode Illuminations 
(Pty) Ltd v Ephron.420 Here the court held that generally the only consequence arising 
from circumstances in which a surety also bind itself as co-principal debtor, is that it 
implicitly renounces the ordinary benefits (benefits of excussion421 and division422) 
available to the surety and becomes jointly and severally liable together with the 
principal debtor.423 However, a different point of view was taken in Firstrand Bank v 
Carl Beck Estates (Pty) Ltd424 where the court held that a surety who bound itself as 
both surety and co-principal debtor will remain a surety, as its liability arises entirely 
from the contract of suretyship. The court added that signing as surety and co-
principal debtor does not make the surety liable in any capacity other than that of a 
surety who has renounced the benefits of excussion and division. 
In Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio v Greeff,425 which dealt with the liability 
of sureties during business rescue proceedings, the court stated that a distinction 
should be drawn between the liability of sureties before the adoption of a business 
rescue plan and after its adoption.426 Before the adoption of the business rescue plan 
the debtor is liable to the creditor for the original principal debt as stipulated in the 
contract of suretyship.427 After the adoption and implementation of the business 
rescue plan the creditor will be bound by the business rescue plan irrespective of 
whether or not it voted against the plan.428 Therefore, the right of a creditor to hold a 
surety liable after the adoption of a business rescue plan will depend largely on the 
wording of the plan.429 If the plan provides that the creditor’s claim will be paid 
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partially in full and final settlement, the principal debt will be extinguished and the 
surety can no longer be held liable.430 
3.8 Insolvency of the principal debtor or surety 
The principal debtor’s insolvency will not release the surety nor will it be immediately 
liable for the debt payable (if it is not yet payable), as the surety becomes a 
conditional creditor of the principal debtor’s insolvent estate.431 This was confirmed 
by Van Der Heever JA in Kalil v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd432 where the court 
held that the insolvency of the surety does not terminate the suretyship and creditors 
are permitted to prove a claim for any amounts currently due to them. A creditor of 
the principal debtor will also be a creditor of the surety, even if the surety has the 
benefit of excussion at its disposal.433 The creditor’s claim is reliant on both the 
principal debtor’s default and excussion (if the surety has the benefit of excussion).434 
In the absence of the surety enjoying this benefit, the creditor will have to prove its 
claim against the insolvent estates.435 Where the creditor has successfully proved its 
claim against any of the insolvent estates, it will be entitled to receive dividends from 
every insolvent estate.436 Where it receives only partial payment from the principal 
debtor or its insolvent estate before proving its claim, the creditor will still have a 
claim for the balance.437 The surety will be discharged to the extent of payment 
received from the principal debtor or its estate.438 A creditor will not be entitled to 
recover more than the total amount owed to it and any amount it may receive in 
excess must be paid back to the last payer in time.439 
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3.9 Defence actions available to the surety 
The surety’s obligation is accessory to that of the principal debtor, meaning that the 
surety will be able to raise, rely upon, or plead any defence available to the principal 
debtor.440  A distinction is drawn between defences: 
- in personam; and 
- in rem. 
The distinction between the two defences was highlighted in Standard Bank of SA v 
SA Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd & another441 where Rose-Innes J held that the 
difference between defences in rem and defences in personam lies in that defences 
in rem attach to the claim, the cause of action, or the obligation itself and arise from 
the invalidity, extinction, or discharge of the obligation. Defences in personam, on the 
other hand, arise from a personal immunity of the debtor from liability for an 
otherwise valid and existing civil or natural obligation. Furthermore, with a defence in 
personam the obligation and the debt remain intact, while the debtor is personally 
protected from a claim. In the case of defence in rem the obligation and debt are not 
recognised by law – not even as natural obligations.  
The Act provides in section 133 for a statutory moratorium in favour of the company 
under business rescue against any legal proceedings or executions against the 
company, its property and assets.442 The case of Standard Bank of SA v SA Fire 
Equipment (Pty) Ltd & another was highlighted in Investec v Bruyns443 where the 
court held that the moratorium is a defence in personam available to the company 
and cannot be applied to the benefit of the surety.444 The court held further that the 
liability of the sureties would stay intact until the adoption of a business rescue 
plan.445 
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3.9.1 Defences in personam (‘personal defences’) 
A defence in personam refers to a personal action or proceeding directed against a 
specific person arising from a contract or a delict.446 In simple terms it denotes 
defences which are purely personal to the principal debtor and which are not 
available to the surety.447 Examples of defences in personam include: the debtor is a 
minor; the insolvency or liquidation of the principal debtor; or a legal moratorium.448 
3.9.2 Defences in rem (‘real defences’) 
The surety is entitled to raise any defence against the creditor that the principal 
debtor could have raised, with the exception of the personal defences available only 
to the principal debtor.449 Examples of defences in rem include: invalidity; mental 
illness; duress; payment; novation; judgment; misrepresentation; and set off.450 
3.10 Surety’s right of recourse  
3.10.1 Introduction 
The surety has right of recourse against the debtor once it has paid the debt of the 
principal debtor to the creditor.451 This right of recourse will be executed by way of 
the actio mandati contingent on whether the suretyship was undertaken with the 
knowledge and approval of the principal debtor (actio mandati), or without it (actio 
negotiorum gestorum).452 The surety is entitled to be indemnified against not only the 
amount of debt paid, but also any damages, loss, and expenses incurred due to the 
debtor’s breach of contract.453 Included in these losses and expenses are costs 
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incurred by the creditor in suing the principal debtor.454 Before the surety can request 
that the principal debtor indemnify it, it must have made a valid payment455 of the 
debt to the correct creditor456 and have informed the debtor accordingly.457 The 
payment can have been made voluntarily or on the basis of a judgment or court 
order. 458 
An important consideration is whether the surety’s right of recourse will keep the 
company in financial distress. This will involve that after the creditor has successfully 
executed its right of recourse against the surety, the surety will in turn seek recourse 
against the company.459 The surety will attempt to enforce its right of recourse and if 
unsuccessful, possibly attempt to liquidate the company. The company would 
consequently be exposed to the same claims, but from the surety and not the 
creditor.460 Currently this position is not addressed but should the legislature intend 
that the surety will indeed retain its right of recourse, it will certainly have devastating 
consequences for the company. 
Another important consideration is that where the surety could be deprived of its right 
of recourse, such action may be considered unconstitutional. In Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd 
T/A Balanced Audio v Greeff461 – where the court attempted to address the gap in 
the Act by suggesting possible solutions – it was stated that if sureties were to lose 
their right of recourse, it would benefit both the distressed company and the creditor, 
but would be unfair to the surety as it would be rendered voiceless and without a 
remedy.462 In African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd & Others463 the court was faced with the question of whether 
such a deprivation of rights falls within the meaning of section 25 of the 
Constitution.464 The applicant (ABSA Bank) challenged the constitutionality of section 
153(1)(b)(ii) by firstly alleging that section  154 deprived it of its right to exercise its  
voting rights at the meeting of creditors, secondly and that it was also deprived of its 
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right to claim payment of amount owed by the company to it..465 The court stated that 
in order to enjoy the protection of section 25 of the Constitution, the right of the 
creditor must constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of section 25 of the 
Constitution.466 Section 25 of the Constitution does not define the term ‘property’, but 
in the court’s view the term is not limited to land.467 In addressing the issue the court 
held that a claim for payment and the right to vote at a statutory meeting constitute 
property within the meaning of section 25 of the Constitution in that they are 
enforceable against specific parties.468 Unfortunately, however, the applicant’s 
constitutional challenge to section 153(1)(b)(ii) failed.469 
3.10.2 Right of recourse against co-debtors 
A surety, who has also bound itself as surety for co-debtors, has a right of recourse 
against any of the co-debtors for the entire debt.470 Where the surety claims from 
only one co-debtor, who pays it in full, it must cede its right of recourse against the 
other debtors, to that particular debtor.471 Where the co-debtors are not liable in 
solidum,472 the surety’s claim will be limited to the creditor’s respective portion of the 
total liability.473  
3.10.3 Right of contribution from co-sureties 
The term co-sureties is used  when two or more people undertake liability as surety 
for the same principal debt and obligation.474  Co-sureties differ from ordinary 
sureties in that they have the benefit of division at their disposal, unless this has been 
excluded.475 The surety who pays the principal debt to the creditor is permitted to 
claim a pro rata share of the debt from each co-surety.476 Consequently, each co-
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surety will be liable for its share of the debt (singuli in solidum)477 unless otherwise 
stated.478 Ordinarily no contractual relationship exists between co-sureties as it could 
have the effect that the surety who has paid more than its pro rata share of the debt 
will have a right of recourse, based on enrichment, against the other co-sureties.479  
Co-sureties may, however, by way of a contractual agreement, agree on the method 
and degree to which each of them will be liable.480 Therefore, the contractual 
provisions will be used to determine the liability of each of the co-sureties as each 
can be bound by separate suretyship agreements.481 In Executors Estate Watson v 
Huneberg & Leathern482 criteria were developed to determine if sureties are indeed 
co-sureties. The court stated that in order to determine if parties are co-sureties you 
must determine if an identical default by the principal debtor would cause them all to 
be liable for the debt. 
3.10.4 Right of recourse against principal debtor 
Where the surety or co-surety has discharged the principal obligation to the creditor 
fully or in part, it will have a right of recourse against the principal debtor.483 The 
surety will be entitled to recover the amount of debt paid plus any damages, loss, and 
expenses incurred as a result of the debtor not meeting its obligations484. The 
principal debtor and its surety are also permitted to conclude an agreement providing 
for the right of recourse of the surety, in the event it discharges the principal 
obligation of the principal debtor to the creditor.485 Should the surety have taken 
cession of the creditor’s actions486 on or after payment of the principal debt, it will be 
able to enforce the creditor’s rights against the principal debtor.487 The right of 
recourse rises automatically, but is excluded should the surety fail to raise a valid 
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defence (other than a personal defence) which the principal debtor had against the 
creditor, or where it failed to inform the principal debtor of the payment.488 
3.11 Conclusion 
The authors of Caney’s Law of Suretyship provide a well-drafted definition of what is 
considered to constitute a contract of suretyship.489 The purpose of a suretyship 
agreement is to protect the creditor against any loss associated with the principal 
debtor failing to meet any of its obligations.490 This is achieved by the surety 
undertaking a conditional liability whereby it will only perform if the principal debtor 
fails to do so 491 
Suretyship can be distinguished from other contracts – such as indemnity or 
contracts of guarantee – on the basis of its accessory nature in that it requires a valid 
principal obligation between the debtor and creditor.492 
 
In the sphere of business rescue proceedings, the accessory principle has given rise 
to numerous problems of interpretation and application when it comes to the liability 
of sureties.493 When a business rescue plan fails to provide for suretyships, the 
common-law of suretyship will apply.494 The common-law principles regarding 
suretyship provide that the liability of sureties is dependent on the existence of a 
principal debt.495 This means that should the principal debt be compromised or 
extinguished, it will have a similar effect on the liability of the surety.496 For instance, 
should a business rescue plan provide that a creditor’s claim be paid partially in full 
and final settlement of the claim, the principal debt will be extinguished and the 
surety will escape liability.497 
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The first contact between the common-law of suretyship and business rescue was in 
African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) 
Ltd & Others498 where the court held that the position of the sureties was unaffected 
by the provisions of the business rescue plan.499 
 
In Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd t/a Balanced Audio v Greeff and Another500 this argument 
was rejected.501 The court held that because the Act is silent on the right of a creditor 
to hold a surety of the principal debtor liable, the common law must be applied when 
assessing the surety’s liability, unless the deed of suretyship or the business rescue 
plan state otherwise.502 On the issue of the interaction of the common law and 
statute, it stated that a distinction should be made between the legal consequences 
dictated by a statute, and those arising under the common law.503 This means that if 
the statute determines the position, it must be applied irrespective of the common-
law provisions; but should the statute fail to govern a position, we must apply the 
common law.504 In coming to his conclusion, Rogers J considered the decision in 
Moti and Co v Cassim’s Trustee’s505 which relates to the accessory principal 
governing the discharge of the principal debtor by way of a release or compromise.506 
The majority in this case held that relieving the debtor of its debts would result in the 
surety also being released from its obligation even if the law does not so provide.507 
 
In ABSA Bank Limited v Du Toit and Others508 the court considered the accessory 
principle and made the following remarks: “A claim against a surety starts and ends 
with the principal obligation and once the principal debt is altered the accessory 
liability under the suretyship may also be regarded as having been altered”.509 
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Therefore, as can be seen from the above, the position is uncertain and 
unsatisfactory and can only be resolved by legislative reform or a judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATION 
In this dissertation, I considered the liability of sureties before and after the adoption 
and implementation of a business rescue plan. From my evaluation of current 
legislation and case law, several shortcomings have been identified, as pointed out in 
my preceding chapters, as with regards to the regulation of sureties of companies 
during business rescue proceedings. 
The conclusion reached is that the position of sureties is currently uncertain. This is 
due to, firstly; Chapter 6 of the Act not addressing the position of a surety for a 
company in business rescue and secondly; the divided approach of the courts on 
whether creditors can hold a surety of a debtor company liable.510 
In an effort to address the current uncertainty, I recommend that the legislature 
should intervene and deal specifically with the issue of the liability of sureties as this 
will make the intention of the legislature known. This can be achieved by amending 
current legislation to incorporate the position of sureties during business rescue 
proceedings. 
After considering the provisions of sections 311(3) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
and section 155(9) of the current Companies Act511, I propose that the following 
provision should be added to Chapter 6 of the Act: 
“Despite the wording and adoption of a business rescue plan and the provisions of section 154, the 
adoption of a business rescue plan does not affect the liability of any person who is a surety of a 
company in business rescue, unless the surety agreement specifically exclude the liability of the 
surety”. 
Incorporating the suggested provision above will go far in providing greater legal 
certainty and clarity on the position of creditors against sureties in business rescue 
proceedings. 
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